The question is raised as to the relative degree of determinance exerted on the distribution of rewards (egalitarian and differential) in groups by (1) the group's status structure and (2) the external consequences following the distributions. A longitudinal, laboratory experiment was designed requiring one-hour's participation of each group for ten days. The data indicated that, under the conditions of the experiment, external conquences could effect greater control of the group's reward distributions than the group's status structure.
osition? Following the previously mentioned assumption that the "real" power behind normatively-based status structures are the consequences they imply, it is predicted that the extemal consequences are the more powerful. As this proposition refers to process (frequency over time), it does not negate the possibility that status differentiation might be momentarily more powerful. This investigation confirms just such a possibility. However, the proposition does suggest that extemal consequences will become a more powerful determinant of reward structures if the consequences occur consistently over a period of time.
METHOD
Ten groups composed of three persons were randomly assigned to one of two experimental variations. Within each group, the subjects were unacquainted with one another. The subjects were all volunteers from sociology classes, at Northwestern University, who had been told they would be taking part in a study of problem-solving in small groups. Their involvement would require one hour each day for twelve days. It was emphasized that the subjects imderstand that if they volunteered they could not drop out in the middle of the experiment, and must participate the full twelve days.
Each group was ushered into an experimental room and seated around a table. Once seated, each subject was given an instruction sheet. The experimenter read the instructions aloud:
You will be working as a group on a problem involving a matrix (7x7) of plus and minus units. The matrix is on the blackboard which you now face. The task involves, first of all, the experimenter's choice of a column of the matrix identified by a colorred, blue, yellow, etc. He will not announce his choice, however, until your group has agreed on a row of the matrix identified by "Able," "Baker," "Charley," etc. The intersecting cell of the experimenter's column-choice and your row-choice indicates your payoff for that trial-either a plus or minus unit.
Each unit is worth 30 cents and you will be paid at the end of each trial. You will also have to invest some money at the beginning of each trial. I will discuss this in one moment. In addition, if your group does become particularly proficient at this task, you will be excused two days earlier than the originally scheduled twelve days. You will have 30 trials on each day of your participation. If your intersecting cell indicates a plus value, you will receive 30 cents but, of course, lose your investment. The money won will be put in a "player-pool." If the cell indicates a minus value, you will not receive the 30 cents as well as lose your investment.
On each trial, your group will have a minute and a half to make a decision as to your choice of rows. You will have an additional half minute to decide what you want to pay yourselves for that trial. This money will come from the player-pool. You do not have to pay yourselvra any particular amount of money, but you must pay yourselves something at the end of the trial. It is not necessary that each of you be paid an equal amount of money on each trial. The player-pool will be lent $5.00 to begin the task. This must be repaid at the end of the experiment. Your investments will come from your own money, not from the player-pool. Each of you will be lent $2.50 to begin the task. This must be repaid at the end of the experiment.
Finally, I would like to assign each of you a task. Number 1, you will be the "leader." Your function will be to make the final decision in matters on which the members of the group cannot agree within the time allotted. You will invest 7 cents at the beginning of each trial.
Number 2. you will be the "secretary" and keep track of the experimenter's columnchoices and the group's row-choices. You will also have certain information that the other two members will not have. You will have a paper that tells you two columns that the experimenter will not choose on each particular trial. If you want to show this information to the others, you may; but it is not necessary that you do so. You will invest 4 cents at ihe beginning of each trial.
Number 3, you will be the "treasurer." You will collect the investments from each member at the beginning of each trial and give them to the experimenter. You will also distribute the money from the player-pool to each of the group members after each trial according to the group's decision. You will invest 4 cents at the beginning of each trial.
Finally, one very important point. The experimenter will be using a complex system in determining his choice of columns. Your major task will be to detect this system and to coordinate your choice of rows with his choice of columns. Then you will be able to achieve a plus unit rather than a minus unit. Now, are there questions concerning what you are supposed to do?
Following the question period, the experimenter took his seat at a small table containing a stack of papers and five boxes of pennies. He gave each subject one box containing 250 pennies. The player-pool box containing 500 p>ennies was given to the "treasurer." A paper containing two "incorrect" columns for each trial was piven to the "secretary." The subjects were then asked to begin by collecting the investments for the first trial and giving them to the experimenter. They then continued by guessing the experimenter's first choice of columns and picking what they thought would be a "profitable" row.
MANIPULATION OF STATUS DIFFERENTIATION. Since one of the major potential problems for the present investigation was the general lack of differentiation generated in informal experimental groups, the pre-manipulation design was, in part, an attempt to structure such status differentiation. As described in the instructions to the subjects, this was accomplished by three techniques: (1) power differences of the "leader," "secretary," and "treasurer"; (2) scarcity of resources differences embodied in the "secretary's" control over important information; (3) investment differences (i.e., the "leader's" investment of 7 cents compared to the others' 4 cent investments). A fourth basis of differentiation which was expected to develop were differences in "expertness" in terms of the subjects' "apparent" abilities to predict the experimenter's column-choices. "Expertness" was measured in terms of the percentage of times a subject's verbalized prediction as to the correct row was 'confirmed." If during any day of experimentation (30 trials) the difference between any two subjects' percentage was as large as 25%, expertness differences were said to exist.
At the macro-level of analysis, Davis and Moore have suggested only two clues as to what constitutes the "functional importance" of positions in society: (1) the degree to which a position is functionally unique, there being no other positions that can perform the same function satisfactorily; (2) the degree to which other positions are dependent on the one in question. At least three of the structural differentiations operating in the present experiment involve positions of "uniqueness." There is only one "leader," one "secretary," and one "high investor." It is also possible that there be only one "expert." The differentiations also meet the second criterion in that the group members are dependent on the "leader" for decisions, the "secretary" for important information, and the "expert" for intelligence and skill. Davis and ?^Ioore also associated investments of time, energy, and money in training with positions of functional importance. Although this experiment does not involve investments as a result of training, it does utilize differential monetary investments per se in the "high" and "low investors." MANIPULATION OF EXTERNAL CONSEQUENCES. TO effect the desired manipulation of the external consequence variable, the "correctness" of the group's choices and the resulting payoff were not determined by the group's rowchoices but by the group's distribution of rewards at the end of the previous trial. For the first five days (150 trials), groups in Variation I received a "correct" indication and 30 cent payoff (positive consequences) each time they distributed their player-pool money equally on the preceding trial (egalitarian distribution) and received an "incorrect" indication and no payoff (negative consequences) each time they distributed their player-pool money unequally on the preceding trial (differential distribution). Concerning the latter situation, it did not matter what kind of differential distribution they used as long as one or more members received an amount differing from that received by any of the other members. (A more rigorous interpretation of the procedures would state that, in the case of the egalitarian distribution, the consequences follow a single behavior; while in the case of the differential distribution, the consequences follow a "class" of behavior.) For the remaining five days (150 trials) the procedure was reversed. Groups in Variation I received a "correct" indication and 30 cent payoff (positive consequences) each time they distributed their player-pool unequally on the preceding trial (differential distribution) and received an "incorrect" indication and no payoff (negative consequences) each time they distributed their player-pool money equally on the the preceding trial (egalitarian distribution).
In order to control possible order effects, the treatment of the groups in Variation II was the opposite of that of Variation I. During the first five days, the groups received positive consequences for differential distributions and negative consequences for an egalitarian distribution. For the last five days, they received positive consequences for an egalitarian distribution and negative consequences for differential distributions. All groups were dismissed at the end of the tenth day. At this time, the subjects were informed as to the real nature of the experiment, shown data gathered from their session, and asked for their cooperation in not discussing the experiment with anyone. If their "earnings" proved to be less than $10.00, they were paid the difference.
The experiment attempted to manipulate three extemal consequences. However, it was anticipated that they would have their effect at different times. Two of the consequences, the "correctness" of the group's prediction and the 30 cent payoff, would be most effective during the first part of the experiment. If, however, the subjects would become tired or bored with the task toward the end of the experiment, then the consequence that each "correct" prediction brought them closer to being dismissed from the experiment two days early would become effective.
The experimenter coded the following information: (1) the money distributed to each member on each trial; (2) the times the "leader" made the decision for the group; (3) the "expertness" of the group members in terms of their apparent ability to predict the experimenter's column-choice; (4) the times the "secretary" withheld the scarce information.
RESULTS

EFFECTIVENESS OF MANIPULATIONS.
The effectiveness of the status differentiation manipulations may be viewed in two ways-the differentiation structure, with its normative prescriptions, which is instituted in the experiment and the differentiation performances which, in some cases, are not experimentally controlled. Of course, the latter is the one subject to effectiveness measures.
(1) Power differentiation performances (final decision-making in matters on which the group members cannot agree) were made on an average of 37 times during the 300 trials (range: 23-61). An average of 25 such decisions involved the row-choice of the group while an average of 12 involved the player-pool distributions. While this does not represent the most effective manipulation of power differentiation, it does provide a more effective manipulation of extemal consequences. If the leader-decisions involving the reward distributions were frequent, the results of the experiment would be subject to the interpretation that they are not a function of the effect of extemal consequences on group behavior but rather a function of the effect of such consequences on the leader's behavior. (2) Investment differentiation performances (investing 7 or 4 cents on each trial) were made on each of the 300 trials. Power and investment differentiation performances always overlapped due to the experimental manipulations. (3) Resource differentiation performances (withholding knowledge of two incorrect columns) were made on the averge of 8 trials per group (range: 0-13). While this itself does not indicate effective manipulation, the threat of such behavior as a result of the differential structure and a few actual instances of information-withholding may have still produced the desired effect. During a post-experimental discussion, all but two groups indicated that throughout most of the experiment they had felt the possibility of such behavior. (Of the two groups, one indicated they had such feelings during only the first part of the experiment.) (4) Expertness differentiation performances occurred on the average of 67 trials (range: 41-72). This differentiation overlapped the investment and power differentiations an average of 26 times (range: 20-36) and the scarce-resources differentiation an average of 32 times (range: 22-39). The post-experimental discussions indicated that all groups felt there were differences in percentage of predictions "confirmed." However, five groups agreed that "confirmation" was more a matter of luck than skill.
The major question concerning the effectiveness of the external consequences manipulation is whether the subjects became aware of the true determinant of the consequences they received-their reward distribution. This is a very difficult question to anwer. Patterson found no significant relationship between awareness of such contingencies and changes in the performance of children.^ Spielberger, however, found that verbal conditioning occurs primarily when the subjects become aware of the consequence contingencies.^ He also found that the subjects only reported their awareness after intensive interviewing. An intensive interview may itself increase the subject's awareness of the contingencies and, not wanting to appear fooled by the experimenter, the subject may report he knew about them all the time. The present investigation used only a brief post-experimental interview in which the groups did not report being aware of the real determinants. Three of the groups indicated they suspected their row-choices were not determining the consequences. However, they could not decide what was actually causing them. A more valid indicator of awareness may be the subject's behavior during the session. If one subject became aware of the contingency, he might communicate this finding to the other subjects in the group in order to (1) win more money and be excused from the experiment sooner or (2) foul up the experimenter (something all deceptors deserve). There was no such communication in any of the groups in this investigation. However, not all subjects may communicate their findings if (1) they are interested in the welfare of the experiment and think revealing this information would be detrimental to it or (2) they think their discovery of the experimenter's deception will terminate their opportunity to win more money.*D uring the pretest, three groups discovered the true contingencies. In one case, the session was terminated. In the other two, they were continued to observe what would develop. Both groups discontinued the task, ribbed the experimenter, walked around the room, and intermittently returned to the task ''to see if their system still worked." One group stacked pennies as high as they could. After fifteen to twenty minutes, they returned to the task for the remainder of the session. A greater attempt was then made to prevent subjects' awareness of the contingency by diverting their attention from the reward distribution. Emphasis on the complexity of the experimenter's system of column-choices, the size of the task-matrix, and the time between the group's reward distribution and their pay-off on each trial were increased. In addition, volunteers who had attended courses in social psychology were eliminated from the sample.
Even if the subjects were aware of the contingency, there still remain several theoretical questions. Do the external consequences or the awareness explain the group's behavior? What is the difference between not being aware of the contingency while learning a behavior and not being aware of them once the behavior has been performed enough to become "habit?" Is unawareness a necessary prerequisite for the test of the hyp)othesis? Each is an empirical question yet to be investigated. The fact that this investigation attempts to use unawareness is not meant to represent a support of that position.
TEST OF THE HYPOTHESIS. Figure 1 
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FIGURE 1
• The figure shows the cumulative increase in the number of differential distributions over 300 trials. If the line moves in an oblique direction, it means that on that trial the group used a differential reward distribution. If the line moves in a horizontal direction, the group did not use a differential distribution. The vertical line at the 151st trial indicates the time at which experimental contingencies were changed.
days) to Group 8 which did similarly for 66 trials (132 minutes or 2 days).
Following the manipulation of the independent variable (151st trial) all groups continued to use the egalitarian distribution for a period of time. Then again, they began to vacillate in their type of reward distribution. Finally, all five groups returned to consistent use of a particular distribution until the end of experimentation but this time it was the differential distribution. This time the groups' consistency ranged from Group 8 which used a differential distribution for 40 trials (80 minutes or over 1 day) to Group 6 which did similarly for 76 trials (152 minutes or 2^ days). 
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FIGURE 2
• See description for Figure 1 . * t>pes. Then, prior to the 151st trial, all groups began the consistent use of a differential distribution. The length of this consistency varied from Group 7 which consistently used a differential distribution for 44 trials (88 minutes or l}2 days) to Group 3 which did similarly for 59 trials (118 minutes or 2 days). Following the manipulation of the independent variable, the above-mentioned consistency continued in all five groups. Next, a second period of vacillating between the egalitarian and differential distributions occurred. Finally, for a second time, all groups consistently employed one type of distribution, only this time it was the egalitarian distribution. The time of this consistency varied from Group 7 which consistently used this distribution for 32 trials (64 minutes or just over 1 day) to Group 10 which did similarly for 52 trials (104 minutes or close to 2 days.) Table 1 shows the number of egalitarian distributions per day of experimentation for the five groups in each variation. True, the number of egalitarian distributions was significantly more on days 4, 5, 6, but significantly less on days 9 and 10. The statistical analysis also shows a significant differ- 6-7 ence between days within each variation. In Variation I, the number of egalitarian distributions decreased significantly between days 1 and 2, 6 and 7, and 8 and 9. The number also increased between days 3 and 4. Within Variation II, the number of egalitarian distributions decreased significantly between days 1 and 2, 3 and 4, and 4 and 5. The number increased between the days 6 and 7,8 and 9, and 9 and 10. Throughout the experiment, the high-status subjects failed to receive the largest amount of the player-pool in only 109 of the 2030 trials on which some differential rewarding was made. Although in the beginning of the experiment the reward distribution corresponded closely to both the powerinvestment and expertness differences, as the session progressed the distributions show a decreasing correspondence to the expertness differences. This is compatible with the post-experimental reports that five groups felt that the "expertness" was more a matter of luck than skill.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Every group began the experiment using an egalitarian reward distribution. They varied in the number of periods in which this distribution was used consistently. One explanation might be that the laboratory, the experimental situation, and the fellow subjects were unfamiliar to most of the subjects. At first, they do not know how they should behave. They probably suspected because it was an experimental laboratory that many things were operating in the experiment (and on their behavior) which were not pointed out by the experimenter or which were not obvious to them. As a result of this unfamiliarity, the subjects may have relied on their expectation of the expectations of the experimenter and other subjects as they are representative of the larger university community. With the current sentiment of the university favoring egalitarian social policies, unequal distributions of rewards generally have to be justified. Having no frame of reference for the exp)eriment, the subjects may have used that of the larger community. It may also be that the small groups with which the subjects had experience (i.e., family, peer group) used egalitarian distributions. Older subjects may have more experience with formal groups and as a consequence have a frame of reference more compatible with differential distributions. Since individuals w ithin the university vary as to (1) their commitment to the egalitarian philosophy and (2) their experience in egalitarian small groups, the groups varied within each variation as to the length of time they maintained the egalitarian distribution. Thus, the following proposition might be used to account for the initial period of egalitarian reward distribution: given the unfamiliarity of the experimental situation, (1) the egalitarian philosophy of the university community, (2) the subject's experience with egalitarian small groups, and (3) the frequency of positive consequences following egalitarian reward distribtuions will increase the frequency of an egalitarian reward distribution during the initial phases of an experiment.
Following this period, all groups began to vacillate between the two styles of reward distribution. This effect may be the result of competition between the subjects' prior experiences (pre-experimental variables mentioned above) and the various experimental manipulations. If the above suggestions are correct, the status-differentiation manipulations competed with the prior experiences in both experimental variations. The external-consequences manipulations competed with the prior experiences in Variation II, but they reinforced them in Variation I. Under these conditions, it might be expected that the period of vacillation would be longer in Variation I. The average length of the vacillation period was 82 trials in Variation I and 73 trials in Variation II. It might also be expected that the number of vacillations would be greater in Variation I. The average number of vacillations was 15 in Variation I and 12 in Variation II. In neither case is the difference statistically significant. However, a more rigorous test might support the proposition that: contradictions (1) between pre-experimental variables and experimental manipulations {particularly if some of the latter contradict the former while others reinforce them) and (2) between status differentiation manipulations and external-consequences manipulations will increase the vacillation between reward distribution alternatives.
All groups then entered a period of consistent use of a particular reward distribution (Variation I, x=76; Variation II, x=88). In Variation II, the occurrence of the differential reward distribution followed the predictions of both the status differentiation proposition and the external-consequence proposition. Both predicted a differential distribution, while the former specified that this distribution would correspond with the status differences contained in the structure. However, in Variation I, the development of the egalitarian reward distribution conflicted with the prediction of the status differentiation proposition, but it confirmed the external-consequences proposition. As a result, the evidence suggests that the external consequences proposition is more powerful when considering process and that under status differentiation -external consequences conflict, the frequency of positive consequences will increase (and negative consequences will decrease) the frequency of a given reward distribution.
The importance of the process assertions is amply demonstrated by the groups' continued used of a particular reward distribution after the change in experimental conditions at the 151st trial. Here, for a time, existing external consequences appear to lose their control. In Variation II, the continuous occurrence of the differential reward distribution is compatible with the status differentiation but not with the external consequences. However, the process assertions were that the distributions would be controlled by the frequency of external consequences. Immediately following the manipulation change, the distributions were determined by the frequency of consequences having occurred prior to the change. It requires some degree of frequency following the change before the new consequences gain control. The "some degree" is probably a function of the prior frequency: the greater the frequency of external consequences while establishing a given reward distribution, the greater the frequency required to change a given reward distribution. This proposition is also equivalent to part of the proposition explaining the use of a distribution system at the beginning of the experimental sessions. The more the "egalitarian philosophy of the university community," and the more "the subjects' experience with egalitarian small groups" may be interpreted as the "frequency of external consequences while establishing a given reward distribution" (egalitarian) prior to the subjects' participation in the experiment. As no attempt was made to vary the frequency of external consequences during the establishment of the reward distribution, the proposition cannot be tested. A second period of vacillation then occurred. As proposed in the case of the first period of vacillation, it was probably the result of the decreasing strength of the external-consequence manipulations prior to the manipulation change and the increasing control of the manipulations after the change. However, different than the first period of vacillation, the external-consequences manipulations conflicted with the prior experiences in both variations but the status-differentiation manipulations conflicted with the prior experiences in \'ariation I while reinforcing those in Variation II. As a result, the vacillation proposition would predict a greater degree of vacillation in Variation II than in Variation I. The data shows that the average length of the vacillation period was 71 trials in Variation II and 66 trials in Variation I. The average number of vacillations was 14 in Variation II and 12 in Variation I. Again, the differences are not statistically significant.
The second period of consistent use of a reward distribution provided the second test of the major proposition (Variation I, x=54 trials; Variation II, x=:41 trials). In Variation I, the data conformed to both status differentiation and external-consequences propositions. However, in Variation II, the data supported the external-consequences proposition while contradicting the status differentiation proposition. At the same time, the second test eliminated the possible effect of the order of the experimental manipulations.
In summary, the data strongly support the proposition that under status differentiation-external consequences conflict, the frequency of positive consequences will increase (and negative consequences will decrease) the frequency of a given reward distribution. Thus, the status differentiation proposition appears to be conditional. If the group's differential distribution is followed by positive consequences, the distribution will continue to persist and conform to the structural proposition. Under the present experimental situation, the differential distribution corresponded most closely to the powerinvestment aspect of the status differentiation. However, if the group's differential distribution is followed by negative consequences, the distribution of rewards will not conform to the structural proposition; but instead it will be determined solely by external consequences. (It would be interesting to see if external consequences favoring differential distribution, but a differential distribution not compatible with the status differentiation proposition, could gain complete determinance of the distribution.)
The experimental proposition may also account, in part, for the inconsistencies that are sometimes found among indices of social status. For example, in this investigation, the correlation between the "status structure dimension" and the "reward-distribution dimension" of the stratification system of a group is a function of the external consequences following the associations. Therefore, one might predict there would be little stress to change inconsistent-status situations in which such inconsistencies are followed by positive consequences for the group.® Similarly, it could be predicted there would be stress to change consistent-status situations in which such consistency is followed by negative consequences for the group. This might be particularly true where the group has a task which is most effectively solved by a division of labor.
At least four important questions arise concerning the generalizability of these findings. (1) If the group members had been allowed to leave the group, would they have done so-^possibly because the group's reward distribution did not correspond to existing structural differences such as status, leadership, investment, etc.? And would the group be unable to refill the vacated position, thereby creating additional pressure to adopt a differential distribution? Does such "status incongruence" prevent the complete determinance by external consequences in situations where alternative courses of behavior are available, perhaps where such incongruence or conflict is absent? (2) As most of the world is composed of groups already using differential distributions, would an emerging group, being more or less dependent on existing groups, experience external consequences other than those contingent on differential distributions? This may be the reason behind the apparent universalism of the stratification of reward distributions. If an emerging group could avoid the consequences provided by groups already differentiated on the basis of reward distribution, the probability of their developing an egalitarian distribution might be greater. (3) Probably most of the external consequences "operating" on groups are not as clear, immediate, or regular as those existing in the present experiment. What effect does this have? Does it simply take longer to establish the determinance achieved in this experiment? Or are its effects more dramatic? (4) Can "consequences" be identified in all situations? Is the concept too general to be useful in most research situations, particularly using more macro-units of analysis?
•It has also been proposed with some experimental evidence that there is little stress resulting from inconsistent-status situations in which the inconsistencies were expected by the group members. See: Edward E. Sampson, "Status Congruence and Cognitive Consistency, " Sociomeiry, 26 (June, 1963), pp. 146-162; and Arlene C. Brandon, "Status Congruence and Expectations," Sodometry, 28 (September, 1965), pp. 272-288. 
